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ABSTRACT. Closely following timely developments with regard to the European unification
process, this paper focuses on recent migration policies taken with regard to labour immigrants
from new EU member states. In the course of the May 2004 enlargement round, many ‘old’
member states decided to either delay free movement with a number of years or restrict it by
limiting labour market access. It is argued that these policies are deeply grounded in ‘fear’; fear of
mass migration as such, as well as fear of the immigrants’ impact on domestic employment,
housing markets and social welfare systems. To this purpose, the paper starts with the elaboration
of a theoretical framework around the concept of ‘moral panic’, drawn from the sociology of
deviance, which is embedded in literature on boundary drawing and socio-spatial exclusion of
immigrants as unwanted ‘strangers’. By means of a narrative analysis of the free movement policy
issue as it has unfolded in the Netherlands, it is subsequently demonstrated that ‘fear of mass
migration’ has indeed played an important role in the ‘bordering’ of immigrant workers from new
member states. Where appropriate, the narrative’s results are placed within a wider context of
migration and EU enlargement.
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2“Help! The Poles are coming1”
(narrating a contemporary moral panic)
It is widely acknowledged that this is the age of moral panic.
Kenneth Thompson, 1998, p. 1
1 Introduction
April 16th, 2003, can be regarded as an historic date in the process of European unification. This
day witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Athens, in which the accession of ten new member
states into the European Union was laid down. In the course of that same year, the ratification of
this Treaty led to fierce discussion in parliaments in present member states over some of the
possible (negative) consequences of enlargement, among which for example food safety, crime
and human trafficking. The focus of this paper is on yet another of these issues, and a highly
controversial one indeed: labour immigration. Having devoted many years to preparation for the
acquis communautaire and the absorption of the Structural Funds, accessing countries were
expecting to be granted the four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital and labour)
upon accession. In rapid succession however, the national governments of Germany, Austria and
France closed their borders to labour immigrants from newly associated member states for a
period of at least five years, and possibly seven. Spain, Belgium and Finland decided not to allow
immigrant workers from new member countries into their domestic labour market until 2006. A
third group of countries, consisting of Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain and Norway (non-EU)
will exact strict entrance conditions upon employees from new member states, although the
labour market itself will not be closed. It may come as no surprise then, that when the ratification
of the Athens Treaty was discussed in the Netherlands, several Members of Parliament expressed
their concern over a possible inflow from, in most cases, low-rated workers from countries such
as Poland and the Czech Republic. The political and public discussion that followed finally
resulted in a decision to admit this particular group of migrants only in specific sectors of the
economy, wherein labour shortages are considered to be structural and not to be fulfilled by
Dutch workers. In principle though, the Dutch labour market will be closed until 2006, therewith
effectively “bordering migration” as well.
This paper examines the course of events that led the Dutch government to make this decision.
The five-month period in which the issue of potential mass migration from new member states
featured in the media will serve as a case study for this purpose. The perceived threat that the
immigrant workers bring along, apart from their arrival in considerable numbers also their impact
on labour markets, housing markets and social welfare systems is analysed by means of a
narrative. This implies an in-depth case study description of reports of debates, factual data and
media coverage on this topic. The idea behind this exercise is to examine to which extent the
                                                          
1 Provocative title of a television documentary broadcast on September 29, 2003, made by journalist Arthur van
Amerongen and filmmaker Gilles Frenken.
3“fear of mass migration” narrative matches a theoretical framework developed around the
sociological concept of “moral panic”. An introduction to this fascinating concept is presented in
section 2, as well as its relevance in a wider geographical context of bordering (and ordering)
(European Union) space. Section 3 discusses the latest insights into the study of moral panics and
social anxieties in an age of (supposed) unbounded mobility. References are made to the current
state of economic slowdown and its implications for fear of mass migration. Methodological
notes are presented in section 4, focussing on media and narrative analysis. The actual narrative is
carried out in section 5, starting with a brief introduction to current immigration and integration
issues in the Netherlands. This section subsequently offers a detailed chronological analysis of the
events occurring from September 2003 until February 2004, when the Dutch government
announced its decision to restrict free movement. The final part of section 5 draws the threads
together and discusses the narratives’ implications for related cases of fear of mass migration.
The paper is concluded in section 6.
2 “The age of the moral panic” 
2.1 Original thoughts
Finding its roots in the sociology of deviance, the concept of moral panic was introduced by
British sociologist Stanley Cohen in the 1970s. Since every subsequent publication on moral
panics refers to Cohen, and because it would be impossible to present an exhaustive overview of
all of the writings on this particular topic for the scope of this article, I will confine myself with a
short recollection here. In his seminal work “Folk devils and moral panics” of 1972 (reprinted in
1980), Cohen extensively elaborates on an otherwise relatively insignificant uproar between two
groups of youngsters, called the “Mods” and the “Rockers”, the names referring to associated
lifestyles of modernist and fashionable versus anarchistic and provocative. The event nevertheless
caught the attention of a wider public through media exposure and the involvement of experts on
youth culture expressing their concerns over the uproar’s moral implications for Britain as a
whole, and was subsequently blown completely out of proportion by various mass media.
However, the anxiety that seized the nation did not last very long, and faded away again rather
quickly with the emergence of other fears. For a more detailed summary of the Mods and
Rockers narrative as well as in-depth analyses of this classic case of moral panics, see Goode and
Ben-Yehuda (1994), Thompson (1998) and Critcher (2003). 
The reason for naming some discomforting developments in society a moral panic and others not
is threefold (Thompson, 1998 and Snel, 2003). The difference with acknowledged social
problems such as unemployment and social segregation is that moral panics are perceived to be a
threat to the moral order in society itself – or an “ideological conception of some part of it”
(Thompson, 1998, p.8). Secondly, a moral panic is initiated by someone who sees the moral order
being challenged. Those calling attention to a particular threat are called “moral entrepreneurs”
(Cohen, 1972/1980) or, in a slightly broader definition, “claims makers” (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda, 1994). A third characteristic which makes a moral panic is the presence of a person or
4group of persons exhibiting behaviour different from which society considers normal. These
people, deviants therefore, are called “folk devils”:
“In the gallery of types that society erects to show its members which roles should be
avoided and which should be emulated, these groups have occupied a constant position as
folk devils: visible reminders of what we should not be.” 
(Cohen, 1972/1980, p. 10)
In his book, Cohen develops a processual model of the “deviance amplification” of moral panics,
which is characterised by a number of subsequent stages, starting with an initial, triggering event
which society perceives as problematic (Cohen, 1972/1980 and Thompson, 1998). The model
then proceeds to stages of societal “shock” reaction followed by the establishment of sanctioning
control systems. When the panic fades away, a stage has been reached wherein those considered
deviant are confirmed as stereotypes (see for a detailed description Cohen, 1972/1980 and
Thomson, 1998). Although widely acknowledged to be the first model capturing the broad
notion of social anxiety into a more or less demarcated concept, Cohen’s work has been criticised
for its lack of preciseness still. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994), who provide an overall academic
deepening of the concept of moral panic, have attempted to fill out this “gap” by devote an
important part of their book to renewing and adding criteria to the concept of moral panics.
Apart from 1) concern (over a perceived threat), 2) hostility (towards those causing it), 3)
consensus (about the need for a solution) and 4) volatility (of the panic’s intensity in time), the
most important criterion they attach is that of disproportionality. A social problem is a moral
panic only then, they argue, when the general and media attention it receives surpasses the real,
objective threat it poses to society by far. In this respect, it should be possible to produce factual
evidence in the form of, for instance, numerical data of supposed negative consequences, which
implies that most moral panics can be identified only, and sometimes long, afterwards. Goode
and Ben-Yehuda’s work has become known as the attributional model of moral panics (see for a
detailed description Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994 and Critcher, 2003).
An important contribution made by Goode and Ben-Yehuda is that they succeed in embedding
the discussion about moral panics in a wider epistemological debate between objectivists and
social constructionists. Each other’s opposites, objectivists argue that quantification of a
supposed threat would give a solution to the question whether it is possible to speak of a true
moral panic or not, whereas the constructionist view states that every form of anxiety in society is
by definition socially constructed and therefore immeasurable. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994)
propose a more moderate variant of social constructionism, which they call “contextual
constructionism”. Although contextual constructionists subscribe the idea that moral panics
represent a sensed rather than a real threat, they do attempt to verify (or falsify) their perceptions
by producing data and reconstructing chronological events when elaborating their case study
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Although no such quantification is presented in this paper, I will
follow the contextual constructionist approach by assuming that EU-enlargement and
forthcoming east-west migrations are realities to be awaited, and not merely inventions of
terrified and endlessly irrational politicians. 
52.2 Enforcing moral boundaries
Threatening society’s moral order, moral panics first of all challenge the invisible lines wrapped
around that order, protecting it like membrane around cells. With some sense of imagination,
these lines can be called society’s moral boundaries, a metaphor which has been used many times
by moral panic and social exclusion researchers: 
“In fact, it is entirely likely that moral panics serve as a mechanism for simultaneously
strengthening and redrawing society’s moral boundaries – that line between morality and
immorality, just where one leaves the territory of good and enters that of evil. When a
society’s moral boundaries are sharp, clear, and secure, and the central norms and values are
strongly held by nearly everyone, moral panics rarely grip its members – nor do they need to.
However, when the moral boundaries are fuzzy and shifting and often seem to be contested,
moral panics are far more likely to seize the members of a society.” 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 52)
Strangely enough, moral boundaries are defined and made visible only when threatened by some
outside force(s). Norms and values, embedded in society’s history and maintained in silent
consent, are stirred up and brought up for discussion. Often, outsiders are considered
incompatible with these norms and values which in turn may lead to stereotyping, assuming them
to pursue specific agenda’s (stealing “our” jobs) and ways of behaviour, as Cohen implied. A
whole spectrum of terminology is used to identify such outside forces, both in academic and in
policy literature. Touching upon the related notion of mental borders, geography points at
differentiating “Us” versus “Them” rhetoric, the unknown Other, or the offending Other (Sibley,
1995). National and supranational policy documentation names outsiders strangers, aliens even.
In fact, an increasingly large stream of literature is devoted to the “philosophy of strangers”
within social theory (Diken, 1998, Van Houtum, 2003, Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002,
Hier, 2003). 
Continuous moral boundary enforcement may find application in (combined) political, economic
as well as socio-cultural space, therewith providing the moral panic concept with a clear territorial
dimension. This dimension has been made explicit by Sibley (1995):
“Often, but not invariably, panics concern contested spaces, liminal zones which hostile
communities intend on eliminating by appropriating such spaces for themselves and
excluding the offending ‘other’.” 
(Sibley, 1995, pp. 39-40)
Eager to keep the fragile order secure, control mechanisms are installed and enforced upon the
strangers perceived to cause a threat, either excluding them from a territory or restricting their
freedom of movements once inside. In that sense, guarding moral boundaries may result in a re-
erecting of national borders, or of the access into some parts and/or segments of the nation state
or the national economy (for instance a labour market). The enforcement of moral boundaries
6may thus result in strategies of protecting a place from distorting outside influence. This
influence is considered as “abject”, as unfitting into the moral order (Sibley, 1998). Consequently,
being about norms and values, moral panics also involve issues of inclusion and exclusion,
stereotypes and identity. Most moral panics seem to culminate into an establishment or alteration
of some control mechanism; a law, a rule, a regulation. After measures have been taken, most
panics fade away again. Most moral panics thus are of a temporal nature as they: “… heighten
boundary consciousness but … are, by definition, episodic. Fears die down and people
subsequently rub along with each other” (Sibley, 1995). It so may occur that society considers the
action(s) undertaken as appropriate or sufficient, or, alternatively, that a perceived threat does not
become manifest in reality. Another reason could simply be that new threats emerge, which are
considered to challenge moral boundaries even more.
In a timeframe of globalisation and mobility, a dichotomy seems to have emerged between, on
the one hand, those who consider almost everything as fluid and liquid (s.f. Bauman, 2000),
implying a decreased or even nullified importance of determinants of spatial fixity such as
boundaries. Others (s.f. Van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer, 2004) argue that, on the other
hand, borderless spaces of flows with seemingly endless opportunities of personal and mutual
gain might go accompanied by considerable, sometimes overwhelming feelings of uncertainty.
This uncertainty, or uncontrollability, in turn induces powerful strategic actors to reclaim space
where they still are able to. Claiming and reclaiming of space occurs through territorial ordering
and bordering processes aiming to prevent undesired, fear-enhancing strangers from entering a
particular bounded space. A realistic consequence of policies and practices of this kind might be
good old-fashioned spatial purification (Sibley, 1995). In geo-political terms, such socio-spatial
bordering strategies can be labelled “neo-conservative”, referring to the re-emerging desire to
safeguard a place from what is new by enforcing spatial and moral boundaries (Van Houtum,
Kramsch and Zierhofer, 2004).
3 Recent academic discussions 
3.1 Changing versus converging sites of social anxiety
Recent academic discussions have both challenged the concept of moral panic as such and made
attempts to adapt it to contemporary research into social anxieties and the sociology of deviance
in general. A time wherein diversity rather than homogeneity predominates and wherein everyday
life’s securities are threatened by a multitude of hazards which may emerge in any place and at
any time, society’s moral boundaries are increasingly challenged and blurred. In the words of
Goode and Ben-Yehuda:
“Moral panics are likely to ‘clarify [the] normative contours’ and ‘moral boundaries’ of the
society in which they occur, demonstrat[ing] that there are limits to how much diversity can
be tolerated in a society.” 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 29, text in brackets added)
7This development has been assessed by Ungar (2001), who states that at the time of Cohen’s
Mods and Rockers, moral panics emerged (and faded away again) in a dominant discourse of
safety. Identifying folk devils and the supposed threat they caused used to be relatively easy, and
so was the establishment of effective control systems to counterbalance their influence. Because
contemporary fears about, for instance, nuclear disasters and terrorism are far more difficult to
foresee and control, moral panics now emerge in a dominant discourse of “risk society” (Ungar,
2001). This new conceptualisation of social anxiety (as opposed to moral panics) is connected to
the enduring state of many of these contemporary dangers, caused by irreversible global
developments such as industrialisation and technological progress (Hier, 2003). Ungar reproaches
traditional moral panics literature to be exclusively concerned with finding scientific proofs of
disproportionality and identifying folk devils, personifications of “who we should not be”
(Cohen, 1972/1980). As the Mods and Rockers case illustrates, classic moral panics tended to
emerge in localised settings, thereby constituting “limited spatial and temporal threats” (Hier,
2003). Nowadays, Ungar argues, issues of a global scale are a far more important cause of social
anxiety; nuclear and other environmental threats, epidemic diseases such as SARS, and so on.
These phenomena, obviously, lack a clearly defined folk devil, which renders them very difficult
to seize and therefore, they are perhaps even more reason for concern. Moreover, the diffuse
character of contemporary social anxieties generates new types of folk devils; governments,
companies, even multiple institutions at the same time (Ungar, 2001). 
Hier (2003) offers an alternative evaluation of the value of the traditional moral panics concept in
what sociologists call “late modernity”. Whereas Ungar regards moral panics and risk society as
fundamentally different and incompatible, Hier argues that although the concept indeed calls for
a re-interpretation, sites of social anxiety are converging instead of diverging. It is true that
(almost) no-one escapes awareness of globalisation through the influence of the (mass) media,
but this awareness has to be separated from the enduring importance of the immediate (socio-
spatial) environment: “peoples’ perceptions of risk are situated within the context of routinised
and normalised local order and the production and functioning of everyday living” (Hier, 2003).
The risk society is mediated, but not necessarily lived. The importance of the normalised local,
done away by Ungar, still holds in Hier’s view. Regardless of spatial scale, “moral panics articulate
beliefs about belonging and not belonging, about the sanctity of territory and the fear of
transgression” (Sibley, 1995). The “quest” for order is situated in a struggle against the
unforeseen, the unexpected (Hier, 2003). “In an ordered community, the vulnerable individual
finds security. This security can only be maintained through the establishment and enforcement
of control systems, securing the bounded community from which the enemy-like stranger is to be
excluded” (Hier, 2003).
Against this background of new sites of social anxiety and uncertainty over whether they can or
cannot be compared to original forms of moral panic, the question arises if these new concerns
can be related to more “mundane” circumstances such as economic slowdown. Sibley is rather
clear about this:
8“One of the most remarkable features of moral panics is their recurrence in different guises
with no obvious connection with economic crises or periods of social upheaval, as if
societies frequently need to define their boundaries.” 
(Sibley, 1995, pp. 39, 40)
To me, it is arguable whether this statement (still) holds. It so seems that the current state of
economic slowdown, having western Europe in its grasp, is perceived and lived more intensely
than previous recessions. This might be due to the widespread disappointment after years of
sheer endless optimism about the “new” economy, often propagating the end of cyclical
movements characterising the upward trend of economic development and the beginning of a
linear upward trend. The burst of the overheated internet bubble was all too soon followed by
the 9/11 events and their panicky immediate aftermath over terrorism and nuclear threats. With
regard to external border management of the European Union, for instance, fears of enhanced
crime brought about by illegal immigrants are often mentioned (e.g. Anderson and Bort, 2001,
Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002, Mitsilegas, 2002). Especially when labour immigration is
considered, I would advocate the standpoint that economic crises do influence concerns and
fears of mass inflows of migrant workers. Decreased (job) security implies a greater concern over
job competition, which is only reinforced by the potential presence on the labour market of
outsiders who are able and willing to accept more jobs for lower wages. This concern, set in the
mind of the risk-avoiding economic agent, calls for appropriate and effective measures. Open
borders can be closed, competitive labour markets shut down. In this respect, a connection can
be made with the idea of “counter-modernity” (Hier, 2003). This concept, raised by risk-
sociologist Ulrich Beck, aims to capture this desire to reintroduce security and therewith order in
a risk society, if necessary by constructing scapegoats and folk devils out of, most notably,
strangers. In the end, moral panic in a risk society is nothing more than an excuse for
reintroducing order at both the individual and the state level (Hier, 2003).
3.2 Towards an enhanced processual model
Empirically, ideas about the role of the general public have changed as well. Both Cohen
(1972/1980) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) advocated the idea that the general public is the
main claims maker in society. The “vox populi” is said to shed light on what fears and concerns
are made use of (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Critcher (2003) does not share this view, as he,
in his case studies, finds that it is in fact society’s elite (politicians, particular interest groups, the
upper-class media), who is the true initiator of moral panics. In this paper, my goal is not to cast
doubt on moral panic as an academically viable concept, and it is by no means to try and theorise
on it further, as Thompson and Critcher have done in recent years. This would require extensive
research far beyond the scope of this dissertation. I do however subscribe to some of the
drawbacks of the original models prepared by Cohen and Ben-Yehuda. Nevertheless, in my view,
the amendments to the original processual model of moral panics made by Critcher allow for an
application to the timely issue of fear of mass migration from newly associated member states.
Critcher (2003) distinguishes eight stages of a process within which a moral panic emerges:
9Table 1: The revised processual model of moral panics
Stage Events Principal characteristics and/or actors
1 Emergence Novelty, threat
2 Media inventory Stereotyping, exaggeration, distortion, prediction and
symbolisation, folk devil
3 Claims making Moral entrepreneurs, relationship to media
orientations, causal explanations
4 Expert involvement Grounds for claims, media accreditation
5 Elite consensus and concern Absence of organised opposition
6 Coping and resolution Proposed solutions, measures adopted
(procedural/legal and effective/symbolic)
7 Fade away Timing, recurrence, subsequent status
8 Legacy Long-term effects, relationships to other issues
Source: derived from Critcher, 2003, pp. 151-153
The model’s first stage captures the emergence of a moral panic. In describing this stage, Critcher
draws on Cohen’s original formulation of “a condition, episode, person or group of persons”
defining the panic’s actual object. Since the circumstances that caused a particular moral panic to
emerge can in most cases only be determined in retrospect, the idea here is that not so much the
condition or the individuals proper are the key initiators, but rather the symbolic threat they carry
along (Critcher, 2003). In the emergence stage, clear folk devils are not yet identified. This occurs
in the second stage, which Critcher calls “media inventory”. Not only is the issue now picked up
by the media, its importance quickly becomes oversized, possibly culminating into
disproportionality. Critcher writes about his case studies “what started as a sectional interest
became a common media agenda”, wherein a symbolic threat is covered and exaggerated
(Critcher, 2003). In the subsequent, third stage, moral entrepreneurs enter the scene. They can be
individuals or institutionalised interest groups, who view the situation as a threat to society or
some parts of it. Moral entrepreneurs can be individuals or organisations who consider claims
making activities their mission, therewith functioning as society’s watchdog, or its “moral border
guard”. In the fourth stage, experts-in-the-field become involved in the moral panic narrative.
Their expertise may be called in by moral entrepreneurs or journalists working on a coverage of
the issue at hand, or they may make their ideas heard in a personal capacity. The involvement of
expert knowledge indicates the elite’s consciousness with the moral panic. The next stage
identified by Critcher takes place precisely at the elite level. Convinced by the threat a particular
event or group of persons pose(s), the majority of decision-making actors is inclined to take
action aiming to counterbalance the threat. Of course, some form of opposition may exist
coming from any party in society, but the general attitude towards the folk devils should be
hostile and defensive. As a logical consequence, the next stage captures a search for solutions
resolving the problem and diminishing the folk devil’s potential harmful influence. This can be
achieved by amending official regulations, laws and procedures. Apart from their procedural and
legal influence, however, the measures taken have an important symbolic function as well: they
serve to demonstrate that the issue in question is taken and reacted upon seriously by the elite,
obviously often formed by elected politicians or organisations which require a strong support
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among the general public. Usually, when action is taken and measures are implemented, the
concern slowly fades away. The general public, the elite, the moral entrepreneurs and, especially,
the media encounter other social anxieties or triggering events diverting their attention away from
the original moral panic. In time, however, it may be renewed by similar events (Critcher, 2003).
In the eight stage, finally, the moral panic is embedded into wider developments in society. New
laws are passed and regulations introduced, which might, directly or indirectly, exert influence
upon the functioning of law-enforcing institutions, enabling them to once more control society’s
moral boundaries. 
An important drawback to Critcher’s extended model is its unfinished status, as he himself refers
to it as “work in progress” (Critcher, 2003). Although his aim is to construct an enhanced
processual model by drawing on both his own case study results and valuable insights from
Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s attributional model, the whole remains a somewhat indecisive mixture
of stages and characteristics supposedly determining a moral panic. An example of this is the
absence of a folk devil in some of the Critcher case studies, which leads him to conclude that
their presence is not a necessary requirement. Furthermore, it appears to be difficult to
distinguish between moral entrepreneurs/claims makers and experts, who are the same in some
cases (in the table, this would imply an overlap of stages 3 and 4). In short, to me it seems that
each particular case of moral panic exhibits characteristics of both a processual and an
attributional kind, though I doubt whether it will ever be possible to produce an encompassing
and exhaustive model in such a bottum-up fashion, wherein multiple case studies and
international comparisons are generalised and abstracted. I do think, however, that the model
would benefit from a continuous refinement of through processing additional case study results.
Its strongest point, therefore, I think is found not so much in its contents, but in the research
method it almost naturally implies: that of narratology. 
4 Methodological notes
4.1 Moral panics and the media
Both Cohen (1972/1980) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) attributed an important, though
not crucial role to the media. According to Cohen, the media act as moral entrepreneur (or claims
maker in Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s terminology). This role is not considered substantially larger
than that of political parties and other interest groups. In other publications on moral panics
however, the role of the media is regarded as absolutely vital. Thompson (1998), in the preface of
“Moral panics”, writes that the title of his book could just as well have been “Moral panics and
the media”, due to the blend of existing literature on the sociology of deviance with publications
on media sociology exhibited in his book (Thompson, 1998). Critcher (2003), who would entitle
his work exactly this a couple of years later, in turn offers five extensive case studies of moral
panics, in which he concentrates on the role of the media. Thompson and Critcher find that a
large part of the “distortion” moral panics suffer from in terms of exaggeration and
disproportionality, can be accredited to the media. In this respect, both authors make a
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distinction in mass and upper-level media. Evidence shows that in Great Britain, for instance,
moral panics are first picked up by the mass media and only then arouse the attention of upper
class media. In this respect, taking into account the specific media circumstances of the country
in which the moral panic unfolds is highly important. A great deal of the existing literature on
moral panics emerged in Britain, where a fairly clear distinction can be made between lower-class
and upper-class media, such as the well-known Sun, Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail versus
quality newspapers as the Guardian and the Times. As Critcher writes however, “in some
countries, for example the Netherlands, tabloid newspapers and their sensationalist brand of
journalism are virtually unknown” (Critcher, 2003). A second and related characteristic of
Britain’s written media is the absence of important regional and local newspapers. Instead, all
national newspapers have a wide circulation throughout the country, which implies that localised
events, too, can be published, read, and become a cause of nation-wide concern rather quickly.
The famous uproar between the Mods and the Rockers, for instance, occurred in a small seaside
town in southern England, but nevertheless featured in every national newspaper the next day
(Thompson, 1998). In the Netherlands, with many regional and even city-specific newspapers,
this transfer of scale may take more time. Concluding, it can be expected that carrying out a
moral panic study in Netherlands on the basis of media coverage might yield results slightly
different from those generally found in Britain by, for instance, Thompson and Critcher.
4.2 Moral panics and narratology 
Without intending to enter into a potentially endless discussion about whether or not everything
could be a moral panic in today’s risk society, I would like to carry out a moral panics study of
another example of social anxiety, and a topical one I would say. This anxiety could be named
“fear of mass migration from new member states after enlargement of the European Union”, or
just “fear of mass migration”. In the following sections, I will present a detailed description of
the events that have resulted in the partial opening of the Dutch labour market for a limited
number of immigrant workers from new member states in the European Union. My goal is to
identify, first, whether the political discussion in parliament and the public discussion in the
media about the height and impact of this number showed characteristics of shared concern, of
consensus about perceived threat, and second, whether the events occurring in the period prior
to the government’s final decision have a definable moral aspect, resembling the moral panic
concept and the boundary drawing rhetoric it implies. In order to illustrate the various relevant
textual fragments which appeared in the media over the five-month period ranging from
September 2003 until February 2004, I will use the technique of narratology. The use of
narratives (detailed chronological case descriptions) as a methodological tool is gaining popularity
in the social sciences, but causes reservations as well. The most important reason for this relates
to the issue of transferability. Mainstream methodological insights learn that it should be possible
to summarise (independent) research results into general knowledge, science’s main “output”.
However, others argue that the strength of case study research, which by definition incorporates
a narrative element, is to be found not in the general, but in the detail (s.f. Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Although it is true that summarising case studies can be difficult, summarising is not always a
(socially) useful activity; often, “the narrative itself is the answer” (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The main
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goal of a narrative, therefore, is to exhibit rather than to demonstrate (Czarniawska, 1998). The
quality of this exhibition is enhanced when there is a sharp eye for detail: “In narrative, the
perceived coherence of the sequel (temporal order) of events rather than the truth or falsity of a
story elements determines the plot and thus the power of the narrative as a story” (Czarniawska,
1998, p. 5). 
To me, choosing narratology as a research method is a logical consequence of engaging in moral
panics as a theoretical framework for writing a text or addressing a research question. In each of
the main publications on this topic, whether it be the Mods and Rockers case or the various cases
Thompson (1998) or Critcher (2003) scrutinise, ranging from sex and AIDS to child abuse and
paedophilia, the analysis starts with a detailed narrative of the events unfolding. The narratives
are, so to say, a prerequisite enabling the researcher to conclude whether a case is an example of
moral panic or not. Moreover, the demand for a strict adherence to chronology in a good
narrative is quite in accordance with Critcher’s extended processual model of moral panics. This
model can be applied to practical cases only when described accurately from the state of
emergence to the state it fades away. Critcher describes the natural connection between
narratology and moral panics as follows:  
“We do not have to apply formal theories of narrative … to note that most moral panics tail
off when Something Has Been Done – or, more accurately, when Something Has Been Seen
To Be Done. If what we have here is a kind of moral fable, in which retribution is exacted
upon the perpetrators of evil, then moral panics can be deconstructed as narratives.”
(Critcher, 2003, p. 141)
As was explained in the introduction to this paper, it took the Dutch government almost five
months to decide upon the issuance of the right to free movement to immigrant workers from
new member states. In these five months, ranging from September 2003 until February 2004, the
issue developed into an intense political and public debate, followed and covered by the media.
Although very much aware of its shortcomings, my aim in the remainder of this paper is to apply
Critcher’s extended model of moral panics to the case of “fear of mass migration”. I will do this
by means of a narrative analysis of the kind described above. This implies that an attempt will be
made to make a strict textual chronology of the events culminating in the decision to install a
maximum immigrant quota on the 23rd of January, 2004. In my analysis, I will make use of news
paper coverage (news, backgrounds, comments), television and radio broadcasts (news,
interviews, documentaries) and other written and electronic sources. I will start with a short
introduction to immigration and integration issues in the Netherlands. It is important to note that
the narrative I intend to write it does not place that much emphasis on context and immediate
connection to theory as would be the case with, for instance, a discourse analysis. I would,
however, like to point at two excellent examples of discourse analyses of migration and asylum
issues. Van Dijk (1997) gives an in-depth account of processes of constructing “others” out of
immigrants in western European parliaments. He convincingly demonstrates that, indeed,
parliamentary debates often negatively represent immigrants as unknown others and therefore
threats to the nation (Van Dijk, 1997). Taking on the perspective of the general public, Lynn and
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Lea (2003) analyse the ways in which public opinion about asylum policy in Great Britain as
expressed in newspapers contributes to the social construction of asylum seekers. They identify a
threefold discursive rhetoric (differentiation of the other, differentiation of the self, and the
“enemy in our midst”), that much resembles the creation of a “new Apartheid” with regard to
asylum seekers (Lynn and Lea, 2003).
5 “Fear of mass migration”: a contemporary moral panic?
5.1 Immigration and integration issues in the Netherlands 
To my knowledge, only one publication has explored the relationship between the concept of
moral panics and practical issues of immigration and integration in the Netherlands. In a thought-
provoking article, sociologist Erik Snel argues that recent debates on immigration and integration
in the Netherlands in many respects resemble the main idea behind moral panics. According to
Snel, the country has recently known three strong moral entrepreneurs, who have launched the
non-integrating immigrant as a contemporary folk devil (Snel, 2003). The internationally best-
known of these claims makers would be right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn. This controversial
personality, before his tragic death in May 2002 often accused of sheer populism and arousing
negative feelings towards foreigners of non-western decent, plead for restrictive immigration
policies in a country which of old has striven for diversity and multiculturalism. In a time wherein
economic downturn renders many jobless and dissatisfaction with integration prevails, Fortuyn
acted as a true catalyst of national sentiments previously thought of as long vanished. The second
moral entrepreneur considered by Snel is Ayaan Hirsi-Ali, one of the Dutch Liberal Conservative
Party’s most prominent members. A successfully integrated black Muslim woman, Hirsi-Ali
regularly features the news headlines with unconventional ideas about the integration, which
according to her ought to be quite synonymous with “adaptation”. Whereas Fortuyn and Hirsi-
Ali encouraged the discussion about immigration and integration among the general public, Snel
points at political commentator and publicist Paul Scheffer as the moral entrepreneur of the same
debate at the elite level (Snel, 2003). Scheffer is the author of an essay called “the multicultural
drama”, which appeared in 2000. The essay heavily criticises the failure of minority integration in
the Netherlands, and marks the beginning of a wholly different perception of immigration and
integration issues. Previously the subject of political care because of economical and cultural
deprivations, the (non-western) immigrant was increasingly regarded as a threat to Dutch cultural
identity and domestic norms and values from this propelling publication on (Snel, 2003).
Herewith, the “moral” aspect of migration and integration issues is highlighted, justifying a
comparison with the concept of moral panics. Although it is only one and by far not the most
influential of the many aspects shaping migration discourses in the Netherlands today, “fear of
mass migration” only reinforces the perceived need for (moral) boundary enforcement. With
regard to labour immigration from new EU member states, Snel quotes a concern “for
uncontrollable consequences, for ‘overstretch’ threatening our society’s character” (Snel, 2003).
Hier (2003) arrives at similar conclusions for Canada, where a moral panic-like fear was
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experienced concerning the arrival of hundreds of illegal Chinese immigrants at the same time. In
the course of a two-month period, reporting media were full of exaggerated stories depicting the
immigrants as crime- and uncertainty-enhancing “elements”, thereby creating both an awareness
of social transformation in Canada and a longing for Euro-Canadian tradition (Hier, 2003). 
5.2 The narrative
An “alert” member of parliament
According to Critcher, reconstructing the exact moment when a moral panic starts off can be
difficult. A key triggering event “may be found in the middle rather than at the beginning of a
moral panic narrative” (Critcher, 2003). In this case however, I would say that the panic about
potential mass immigration from new member states after EU enlargement was launched by a
Member of Parliament (MoP) from the Liberal Conservative Party. When preparing for the
parliamentary debate over the ratification of the Athens Treaty, the MoP comes across the fact
that the Netherlands, contrary to most other EU member states at that time (summer 2003), had
not yet taken a decision about whether or not to close borders for eastern European migrant
workers. He recalls in an interview with “Elsevier”, a weekly opinion magazine:
“I had just been appointed Member of Parliament, assembled all document material, and
found out that parliament never really had discussed properly about the admittance of the
eastern European immigrants. Every aspect [of the Treaty] had been discussed and
negotiated, but not this one.”2
(Interview with Elsevier published on November 15, text in brackets added)
Soon after, on September 24, the MoP participates in a debate in the Dutch Lower Chamber
(Tweede Kamer), which is about an amendment of the so-called Law on Alien Labour
concerning the Acquisition of Labour Supply from states outside the European Economic Area.
During the discussion, he points to the fact that previous Dutch administrations had been basing
their decision not to close the labour markets for immigrant workers from new member states on
a report published in 2001 by the Socio-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad), a rather
influential advisory body to the government3. At that time, the Dutch economy was still
booming, and the report explicitly assumed that these favourable circumstances would largely
continue. In the course of the debate, the MoP introduces the following motion:
“The Chamber, having taken notice of the debate, considering, that as a consequence of the
economic slowdown unemployment in the Netherlands is increasing, that after accession of
10 new member states into the European Union a further distortion of the labour market
can be feared caused by an inflow of relatively cheap labourers, that the accession treaty
                                                          
2 All quotes are literally translated from Dutch. I have attempted to stay as close to the exact meaning of the Dutch
texts as possible without producing bad English (or good “Dunglish”, as some prefer to call English with obvious
Dutch word use and sequence). For reasons of transparency and privacy, no names of key actors involved in the
“fear of mass migration” narrative are mentioned.
3 The current Dutch administration is a centre-rightwing coalition of the Liberal Conservative Party, the Christian
Democrat Party and the Democrat Party.
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leaves open the possibility for the [present] member states not to open the labour market for
these workers for a period of up to 7 years, calls upon the government to, if necessary, take
measures in time by maintaining or accomplishing a general policy measure based on the
Law on Alien Labour to keep the Dutch labour markets closed to employees from the new
member states, for the time being…”
(Official parliamentary documentation on http://parlando.sdu.nl, September 24)
The motion is directed to the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, who is
responsible for Dutch labour market policy. Although the Deputy Minister is not completely
convinced of the importance of the arguments brought forward by the MoP, he admits that up-
to-date information about the numbers of migrants to be expected after EU enlargement is
lacking, as well as knowledge about the positions of other western European countries besides
Germany and Austria. He therefore promises parliament to come up with a memorandum on the
advantages and disadvantages of issuing the right to free movement to labour immigrants from
new member states. Apart from reconsidering to close borders, he will also study the possibility
to require work permits after enlargement. This memorandum is due by the end of the year
(http://parlando.sdu.nl, September 24).
Claims making activities
After a month of relative silence, the issue is picked up by several other Members of Parliament,
on both sides of the political spectrum. The immediate cause for this is the appearance of the
Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and Employment in NOVA, a daily current affairs television
programme, on October 28. During the broadcast, the expectation is uttered that 30,000 labour
immigrants will be coming from Poland only. In response to this, the Deputy Minister declares
that “these are no numbers to be worried about” (NOVA, October 28). A couple of days later,
two MoP’s of the Christian Democrat Party express their concern over this statement, as they
doubt the absorption capacity of the Dutch labour market for such a high number of immigrant
workers. They demand to be told, firstly, the effects of these expected developments for
domestic workers, the low-skilled in particular, secondly, an estimation of numbers of legal and
illegal eastern European employees presently working in the Netherlands, and thirdly, how many
of these people are in possession of a German passport, allowing them free entrance onto the
Dutch labour market already (http://parlando.sdu.nl, November 6).
That same week, the conservative MoP who can by now be considered to be the initiator of the
discussion, increases his pressure on the Deputy Minister by officially asking him to clarify his
expectations on the inflow of seasonal workers after EU enlargement. This question is based on
an article in the Agrarian Newspaper, in which a couple of smaller rural municipalities declare to
be building hundreds of extra housing facilities for employees from new member states
(Agrarisch Dagblad, October 30). The MoP demands that the Deputy Minister examine
unemployment rates and labour supply in the region in question, and whether the initiative taken
by these municipalities is in accordance with official Dutch housing policy
(http://parlando.sdu.nl, November 5). In addition, he once more repeats the questions asked
during the debate about the EU member states issuing and not issuing freedom of movement, as
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well as the demand to reconsider the decision taken by the previous Dutch administration. The
Deputy Minister responds that he is working on the memorandum which will capture all of the
questions asked (http://parlando.sdu.nl, November 6).
On November 19, the Lower Chamber discusses the ratification of the Athens Treaty. Although
the topic of free movement of persons is but one of the many topics on the agenda in the
afternoon and evening of the day on which this much encompassing debate takes place, it turns
out to be the most controversial one. Pim Fortuyn’s Party4 LPF joins the Liberal Conservatives
and the Christian Democrats in their wish that, due to the already disadvantageous and worsening
economic situation in the Netherlands, and due to the fact that several neighbouring member
states have already decided to close borders, the Dutch position not to should be reconsidered.
The left-wing Labour Party, Democrat Party and the Green Party oppose rather firmly,
evaluating such a reconsideration “being not very decent” and “breaking a promise already made”
(http://parlando.sdu.nl, November 19). Nevertheless, when the facts about expected
immigration will prove to be a cause of concern indeed, all parties declare to let go of their
objections. The outer left-wing Socialist Party and the conservative/traditional Christian Parties
share this view.
 
Enter the media
Although the heated discussion does not bring the actual decision any closer, as all of the political
parties prefer to await the memorandum prepared by the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and
Unemployment, it causes a storm of media attention, particularly in the various national
newspapers. In the days after the debate, several MoP’s are repeatedly quoted, most notably the
Liberal Conservative MoP5 who fears that “the Netherlands will become the lowest drain on the
European labour market6” if borders are kept open (quoted in Volkskrant on November 20, and
in Trouw on November 22). The spokesman of the Labour Party and the spokeswoman of the
Democrat Party in turn accuse the right-wing parties outright of “arousing negative sentiments”
outside of parliament in appearances in the general public (Volkskrant, November 20). More
specifically, they are referring to the visit of the Dutch Minister of Finance to a conference of his
Conservative Party. During the conference, he declares himself to be “against cheap Poles”, as
the headlines of an article covering the conference reveals (NRC Handelsblad, November 18).
Furthermore, the Minister says:
“In case Germany, for instance, decides to temporarily close its labour market for Polish
employees, they will flow to the Netherlands. We should not want that.”
(Quoted in NRC Handelsblad, November 18)
                                                          
4 The right-wing party established by Fortuyn in the run-up to the 2002 parliamentary elections continued its
existence under the same name after his death.
5 This MoP is a fellow party member of the MoP who initiated the debate in September 2003.
6 According to the official report of this debate in the Lower Chamber, the MoP in question actually says “the lowest
point on the European labour market” in stead of “the lowest drain” as the newspapers quoted. The Dutch words
for point (punt) and drain (put) are very similar, implying that either parliament’s stenographer or a recording
journalist could have misheard it. In either case, the word “drain” indisputably adds a dramatic flavour to the
statement (http://parlando.sdu.nl, 2003).
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More important even than the supposedly provocative words the Minister of Finance utters, both
spokespersons are tempted to draw the conclusion that the free movement issue has been
discussed and perhaps even decided upon by members of the administration already, albeit
behind closed doors. They are suspicious of a hidden agenda in favour of closing the labour
market, in imitation of Germany, Austria and other countries (http://parlando.sdu.nl, November
19). During the debate however, the accusation is denied by his fellow party members. In the
aftermath, the Democrat Minister of Economic Affairs relaxes the “hidden agenda” theory, as he
turns out to be a fierce advocate of free movement (Volkskrant, November 26). This is in fact
not all that surprising, as the Minister of Economic Affairs is generally known to take on pro-
European standpoints. The discussion in Parliament between, most notably, the Liberal
Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and Pim Fortuyn’s Party on the one hand and the
Democrats, the Labour Party and the Green Party on the other manifests itself within the
administration between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic Affairs.
The discussion spreads
With a deadlock between two powerful administration members thus reached, the last two weeks
of November and the first two of December witness the rise of the public’s voice in the media.
Whereas media coverage up until now consisted mainly of reports of debates in parliament and
relatively short news flashes, comments on the issue of labour immigration from new member
states can increasingly be found in opinion sections, columns and background articles. A telling
example appears, for instance, in NRC Handelsblad on November 21, when an anonymous
reader argues that the fear of eastern European immigrant workers stealing away jobs from
domestic workers is completely out of place. S/he points at the fact that seasonal migration from
central and eastern European countries has been both a common and a successful phenomenon
in the Netherlands in recent years, and to “mutual satisfaction of employers as well as
employees”:
“Employers are happy because Poles work hard, don’t complain and hardly become ill. With
an old-fashioned work-ethic they will pluck gerberas, prune tomatoes or cultivate asparagus
in Brabant and Limburg7 in spring. For many years now it has been impossible to find Dutch
employees for these jobs, which are known to be quite harsh.”
(Quoted in NRC Handelsblad, November 21)
Subsequently, the reader pleas for a combat against illegal immigration rather than an exclusion
of legal workers. Although hers or his professional background is unknown, it would seem that
the reader has a substantial amount of background knowledge to the subject. In general, public
comments about the issuance of free movement to labour immigrants from new member states
come from people who can be regarded experts in the field. Among them for instance a
professor of public finance, expressing his concern over the competitive position of domestic
low-rated workers when the labour market is opened. He also points at a potential increase of
                                                          
7 Brabant and Limburg are Dutch provinces (or, in EU-terminology, NUTS II regions). In May and June of each
year, in between 3,000 to 6,000 (estimations vary) immigrant workers from central and eastern Europe, especially
from Poland, visit these provinces in order to work in agriculture or construction. The asparagus cultivation in
Brabant and Limburg is particularly well-known for attracting seasonal migration.
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government expenditures on social security benefits after enlargement (Financieele Dagblad,
November 21). The professors’ concerns are contradicted by MoP’s from the Labour Party who
accuse him of “elementary school calculating” (Financieele Dagblad, December 10). Obviously
irritated by these words, the professor in turn accuses the Labour Party of engaging in “ostrich
policy” (Financieele Dagblad, December 19). This is an illustrative example of political-public
interaction in the media.
From November 29 until December 13, the regional newspaper Limburgs Dagblad publishes an
article series about Polish immigrant workers in the Netherlands and Germany, and more
specifically in the province of Limburg. In eight background articles, a wide range of related
topics is covered, ranging from the existence of “malafide” labour agencies taking advantage of
powerless immigrants to the negative consequences of the drain of young men from Polish
villages. Although the series provides a realistic and by no means over-dramatised view of the
issue, the objective reader cannot but conclude from it that there are indeed quite a lot of
immigrants to be expected after EU-enlargement. One of the articles is dedicated to German
Poles from areas in southern Poland which belonged to Germany before the Second World War.
Since these people still have German passports, they will be able to freely enter the Dutch labour
market regardless of the decision of the Dutch government. Most of the many Poles in
possession of German passports are, according to the article, quite willing and indeed preparing
to migrate after enlargement8. Similar conclusions are drawn by the makers of another article
series in “Financieele Dagblad”, entitled “The neighbours are coming”. Apart from sharing the
concern over Poles with German passports being mistreated by labour agencies (December 6),
they call in the expertise of a migration professor (November 28 and December 10), several
economists (November 28) and the president of the most important labour union in the
Netherlands (December 16). Starting from the assumption that migrants will be allowed onto the
Dutch labour market after EU-enlargement at some stage in time anyway, the discussion in this
(economically-financially oriented) newspaper centres around the question whether or not to
allow them Dutch social security benefits.
The labour union, generally quite an influential actor in Dutch wage negotiations and other
employment issues, turns out to be one of the most powerful advocates of opening up the
border/unrestricted access. According to their website, the union states “not to be worried by the
stream of migrants crossing Europe” (www.bondgenoten.fnv.nl, December 7). In fact, the labour
union uses the discussion to raise a related discussion about the need for a European-wide
regulation for immigrant workers. Such a “detach guideline” is already effective in the
construction sector (wherein a lot of immigrant workers from new member states are currently
active), and would need introduction in other sectors as well. The president of the union says that
the desire for a future unified European labour market calls for a re-thinking of national
collective labour agreements. He argues that Dutch provisions need to be extended to immigrant
                                                          
8 Whether they will or will not migrate in the end is not important here, as the newspaper article serves to illustrate
the migration potential of the Poles in question. Empirical research has demonstrated, however, that migration
potential hardly serves as an accurate migration forecast (see the previous paper).
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workers, now and in the future. The most important reason for doing this is to combat misuse,
illegal migration and human trafficking (Financieele Dagblad, December 16).
Producing factual evidence
Determined to come up with a well-informed policy decision, the Deputy Minister of Social
Affairs and Employment asks a renowned government-affiliated research agency to conduct an
in-depth study into the advantages and disadvantages of admitting labour from new member
states. This Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) delivers the main “ingredient” for
the Deputy Minister’s memorandum on January 14, 2004. In a brief, though detailed report, the
CPB concludes that in spite of other member states having decided to temporarily close down
the labour market, a relatively small inflow of immigrant workers from new member states can be
expected after enlargement. Based on an analysis of several migration forecasts carried out by
both academic and non-academic researcher, the Bureau estimates an additional number of in
between 3,500 and 8,500 immigrant workers (CPB, 2004). This range does not include seasonal
migration. Moreover, the Bureau expects the majority of these immigrants to fulfil still existing
job vacancies in the bottom segment of the labour market. In that case, no substantial “harm”
will be done to social welfare systems in the Netherlands (CPB, 2004).
For the Liberal Conservative Party, the report is convincing enough to let go of the demand for
the closure of the Dutch labour market. Their spokesman says that numbers “look good”
(Volkskrant, January 15). The Minister of Finance however, also a Conservative, still holds on to
his preference of closing the labour market. The same is true for the Christian Democrats and
Pim Fortuyn’s Party, who seem to be determined not to issue free movement, regardless of the
report and the forthcoming decision of the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and Employment
(Volkskrant, January 15). In a 30-page letter published on January 23, almost a month later than
initially foreseen, the Deputy Minister informs parliament about this decision, which turns out to
be a compromise between opposing parties, so typical of Dutch politics. Instead of fully opening
or closing the Dutch labour market on the first of May, a limited number of 22,000 immigrants
will be allowed access (http://parlando.sdu.nl, January 23). This figure is based on the
estimations made by the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, complemented with numbers of
seasonal migration. In case more than 22,000 people enter, the labour market will be closed. The
letter explicitly states that caution is in order:
“In this respect, it is important to keep in mind that, as the CPB annotates, the estimations
are surrounded with insecurities. This insecurity about the actual number of labour migrants
contains a risk that gains weight when unemployment in the Netherlands rises.” 
(http://parlando.sdu.nl, January 23)
For this reason, the government leaves open the possibility to take further restricting measures if
preliminary numbers of migrants indicate the necessity to do so. Asked about his reaction to the
letter, the Dutch Prime Minister replies brief and to the point:
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“We do acknowledge free movement of persons, but we will not overlook the effects for our
labour market.” 
(Quoted in Volkskrant, January 23)
Herewith, one would expect the issue to be “dealt with”. To the surprise of many however, not
in the least place of the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the last words have
not at all been said. When discussing the letter in parliament on February 3, a majority of parties
(the Liberal Conservatives, the Christian Democrats, Pim Fortuyn’s Party and the Socialist Party)
evaluates the proposed limit as being not strict enough. Still convinced of a greater migration
“threat” than forecasted by the CPB, no less than five motions are introduced in the course of
the debate, either highlighting a specific aspect of the free movement issue or proposing a
solution (http://parlando.sdu.nl, February 3). There is, for instance, a demand that official
requirements for receiving a work permit for immigrant workers from new EU-countries should
be as strict as those for non-EU (and non-EFTA) employees. Another motion questions the
migrant’s ability to integrate into Dutch society, and consequently pleas for them to become
acquainted with Dutch language and culture (http://parlando.sdu.nl, February 3). The argument
proposed by the spokesman of Pim Fortuyn’s Party is particularly lively, as it refers to the love-
hate relationship between the Dutch and water:
“Driven by a dead-end situation in their home country and hoping to receive a royal income
here, workers will massively go westward. It is like water, always flowing to the lowest point.
Coincidentally, the Netherlands is the lowest country in Europe, which means that we need
to be prepared. If the flow turns out to be high tide, we will be to late, because we failed to
take appropriate measures by digging a canal and building dikes.” 
(http://parlando.sdu.nl, February 3)
Upon hearing so many doubts and comments, the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment promises to re-discuss the issue within the administration one more time.
A climax at last
After almost five months of intense, sometimes heated debates and discussions in parliament and
the various media, the “fear of mass migration” narrative reaches its climax when the government
decides upon a final solution on February 13, 2004. In a second, much shorter letter to
parliament, the Deputy Minister announces that instead of installing the 22,000 maximum,
migrants from new member states will be granted access only into specific sectors of the
economy (http://parlando.sdu.nl, February 13). In these sectors, labour shortages should be
perceived as structural and not to be fulfilled by Dutch workers ((http://parlando.sdu.nl,
February 13 and Volkskrant, February 14). The majority of sectors however will be closed until
2006. Having achieved this result, the demanding political parties clearly emerge as overall
“winners” of the debate. The most important opposing actors, the Democrat Party an the labour
union declare to be very disappointed. They question the feasibility of the measures proposed,
especially with regard to the drawing of a list of “open” sectors, which will be adapted and
updated according to the needs of the moment (Volkskrant, February 14 and Trouw, February
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14). Still however, the administration explicitly keeps open the possibility to further restrict free
movement in case either the number of immigrants coming exceeds expectations, or the
enlargement process of the European Union enters a new phase, implying both the accession of
Romania and Bulgaria and that of nations further eastward. In the November 2003 “Elsevier”
interview, the Liberal Conservative MoP who first initiated the discussion in the Lower Chamber
indirectly forecasts such a re-emergence of the “fear of mass migration” narrative, thereby placing
the issue in a wider discussion on the future boundaries of the European Union:
“And then there’s something else. After enlargement of the European Union, another flow
of illegal immigrants will come from countries further east, such as Ukraine. I receive quite a
lot of reactions from staff working at employment agencies, who are warning precisely for
this.”
(Interview with Elsevier published on November 15, 2003)
By the time the Dutch decision is finally through, yet another immigration-related issue has taken
over the media headlines and political and public debate. A direct consequence of recent calls for
a strengthened immigration and asylum policy forthcoming current migration discourses in the
Netherlands (as described in section 5.1), the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration
launches a highly controversial proposal to expel 26,000 “low-opportunity” rejected asylum
seekers. Heavy protests arise from the side of immigration interest groups as well as local
policymakers, destined to put these harsh measures into practice. This protest is fuelled by the
media, eagerly portraying many of the asylum seekers, which causes the issue to completely
overpower “fear of mass migration”. The Minister of Alien Affairs herself speaks of a true
“media hype” (NOVA broadcast, February 3). On February 11, nevertheless, NRC Handelsblad
opens with the heading “Inhospitable Europe makes Poles feel bitter”, introducing a story about
feelings of unpleasant surprise and resentment among policymakers and citizens in Poland as an
immediate reaction to the decision of so many current EU member states to close their borders.
5.3 Drawing the threads together
When the “fear of mass migration” narrative is applied to Critcher’s extended model of moral
panics, a number of interesting observations can be made. First of all, although each of the stages
defined by Critcher is present in the narrative, their sequence is different. Widespread attention
of the various media comes in after claims making activities by a number of concerned Members
of Parliament, and experts-in-the-field enter the stage when all political parties already
acknowledge potential mass migration from new member states to be a “problem” that needs
coping, or at least discussion. Therefore, concluding that an “absence of organised opposition” is
the case here would not do justice to the efforts made by MoP’s from the Labour, Democrat and
Green Parties as well as the labour union. Furthermore, it would seem that the intensity and
therefore the impact of the various stages vary as well. Claims making activities in parliament
have been both frequent and intense. Contrary to this, although a great deal of attention indeed is
paid to the free movement issue by the various media, far-reaching stereotyping and exaggeration
was not found, with the exception of some provocative headlines (“Help! The Poles are coming”)
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and denigrating quotes (“eastern European drooping moustaches”). In line with this, Critcher’s
argument about society’s elites rather than the general public as the actors perceiving a particular
threat, is confirmed. Newspaper coverage and television broadcasts by “upper-class” media (in
the form of opinion sections, article series, discussion programmes and documentaries) cause
uproar among politicians and experts-in-the-field, and not (so much) among the general public.
Obviously, it is important to take into account country-specific media characteristics here, with
Dutch media being perhaps less sensationalist and nationally-oriented than for instance in Great
Britain and Germany.
Table 2: The “fear of mass migration” narrative applied to Critcher’s extended model of moral panics
Stage Event Principal characteristics and/or actors
1 Emergence The Liberal Conservative MoP introduces a motion in
parliament’s Lower Chamber.
2 Claims making The Liberal Conservatives (most notably the Minister of
Finance), the Christian Democrats, Pim Fortuyn’s Party
and the Socialist Party claim a threat to the labour market,
the housing market, the welfare state and Dutch cultural
identity.
3 Elite consensus and concern All political parties agree to await a clarifying report to be
prepared by the Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment. The Minister of Economic Affairs firmly
holds on to free movement throughout the discussion.
4 Media inventory Numerous stories appear in newspapers, on TV, radio and
the Internet, covering news (e.g. debates between
advocates and opponents) and backgrounds.
5 Expert involvement (Academic) experts express their concern over the
migrant’s influence onto the Dutch welfare state. Others,
among which the labour union, relax this influence by
pointing at the advantages as well as the necessity of
labour migration in an ageing society.
6 Coping and resolution The government decides to introduce a limit to the
number of migrants to be allowed access; upon protests, it
decides to impose strict requirements to the issuance of
work permits in specific sectors in addition.
7 Fade away The discussion over whether or not to expel 26,000
asylum seekers (according to the Minister of Alien Affairs
a true “media hype”), overtakes “fear of mass migration”. 
8 Legacy Immediate consequences will become known in the period
after EU-enlargement. Long-term legacy is expected to
become manifest in discussions about future enlargement
rounds and the EU’s final external border.
Source: Critcher, 2003, pp. 151-153
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The question that remains is to which extent the “fear of mass migration” narrative matches the
concept of moral panics. Taking into account the drawbacks of Critcher’s model and the case-
specific characteristics inherent to each moral panics study (Thompson, 1998, Critcher, 2003), I
would say that evidence of fear and shared concern was indeed found. Although perhaps the
outcomes themselves are of a temporary nature, as free movement will be issued to inhabitants of
new member states at some point in the (nearby) future anyhow, the narrative itself provides
insight into the complex balance between fear and desire of labour migration in current EU
member states. In that respect, I subscribe to the idea brought forward by Flyvbjerg that the
narrative rather than its particular outcome is what counts most. With regard to the morality of
the “fear of mass migration” narrative, there is little doubt at first sight that a stronger “moral”
element is embodied in, for instance, the discussion about expelling rejected asylum seekers
(though much resembling a bogus moral, I would say). Concerns about eastern European
immigrant’s impact on labour and housing markets seem straightforward rather than moral,
regarding the current disadvantageous situation in both of these segments of Dutch society
combined with the fact that almost all of the other EU member states are bordering immigrants
from new member states as well. However, the migrants’ perceived influence on the Dutch
welfare state and Dutch national identity do have a clearly definable moral aspect, since these
conceptualisations of social space are by definition bounded (contrary to the respective
transnational and cross-border character of the labour market and the housing market). It so
seems that the current order of the welfare state system and of territorial identity, rooted and
established in periods well before migration discourses altered direction in the early 1990s in the
Netherlands (and in other industrialised countries as well), is challenged. A change towards a new
such order which includes people who are not necessarily born in the Netherlands and do not
necessarily (always) contribute to the Dutch economy, would require radically different views on
issues such as statehood, citizenship and integration, far more directed towards the acceptation of
diversity than is the case now. 
6 Conclusion
Although it would be hard to call “fear of mass migration” a perfect example of moral panic, the
narrative elaborated in this paper did provide support for the view that political decisions over
sensitive issues such as migration are grounded in and caused by fear of becoming “flooded” and
a forthcoming desire to close the nation’s borders and to shut down the labour market. Although
the narrative itself cannot be summarised into general knowledge, its wider significance becomes
visible when compared to similar discussions in other settings. First of all, the same debates have
been held in every other EU member states, and with very much the same outcomes. This sheds
some light, at least, on the extent to which the idea(l) of solidarity towards new member states
and their citizens is being observed in present member states. When placed against a background
of EU-enlargement rounds still to come, starting with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in a
couple of years from now, the question arises whether controversies over migration in the
member states will co-determine where the EU’s external borders will ultimately lie. The
conclusions drawn in this paper are also relevant as in a wider perspective of policies and
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practices towards asylum seekers and undocumented migrants from outside the EU. The re-
bordering of the European Union is a yet unfinished process, and so are its efforts to (selectively)
include and exclude immigrants, whether they come for economic or political purposes. With the
exception of a few who are directed towards clearly specified sectors in order to fulfil well-
demarcated jobs, most immigrants are kept out as undesired strangers. There is no doubt that the
balance weighing fear and desire for migration is built upon thick moral grounds.
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